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ABSTRACT 
The Alaska legislature has codified, in section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes, 
a process through which petitioners can seek a domestic violence protective 
order. Such an order offers petitioners a range of protections against a 
household member who has committed a crime of domestic violence. Most of 
the protections afforded under these orders last one year, and the means by 
which a petitioner could renew a domestic violence protective order has, until 
recently, remained unclear. In Whalen v. Whalen, decided in August 2018 
by a three to two margin, the Alaska Supreme Court clarified that renewal 
process. The court held that a petitioner must suffer a new crime of domestic 
violence before a new domestic violence protective order can be issued. Such a 
ruling may seem quite harsh, and in fact, shortly thereafter, the legislature 
amended section 18.66.100 to provide for an extension mechanism and to 
explicitly reject the notion that a new order must be predicated on a new crime 
of domestic violence. This Note inspects why the ruling, rather than a harsh 
judicial construct, was instead a product of the separation of powers and a 
respect for the limits of the court vis-à-vis the legislature. Further, this Note 
engages with the legislative history to illustrate the development of the statute. 
Lastly, this Note collects corresponding statutes from other states and 
compares them to the current iteration of section 18.66.100. Upon review of 
similar statutes, it is clear that the Whalen amendment merely addressed an 
issue that should have never existed in the first place, and there is still much 
that the legislature can do to build on the Whalen amendment in order to 
reduce Alaska’s high rates of domestic violence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In September 2014, Sarah Whalen obtained a domestic violence 
protective order against her husband, Sean.1 Sean allegedly continued to 
harass and intimidate Sarah and her family, and in September 2015, Sarah 
requested a modification of the 2014 order, hoping to extend it.2 Since the 
vast majority of the order’s provisions lasted only one year—the statutory 
maximum—she felt an extension of the original order was necessary to 
protect herself and her children.3 The superior court, however, denied her 
request to modify the original order, instructing Sarah to petition for a 
new order.4 In November 2015, five months after her divorce was 
finalized, Sarah petitioned for a new protective order against her former 
husband.5 
The superior court held a hearing in December 2015.6 Sean and Sarah 
both testified, but the court limited their testimony.7 Having issued its 
original protective order based on Sean’s behavior up until September 
2014, the court asserted that it could not grant a new protective order for 
those same incidents.8 Under its interpretation of Alaska’s protective 
order statute, section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes, a new order could 
only derive from a new incident of domestic violence.9 The court limited 
Sarah’s testimony to Sean’s actions after September 2014.10 Since then, 
nothing he had done qualified as a new incident of domestic violence, and 
therefore the superior court denied Sarah’s petition.11 Sarah lost on 
appeal, and the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed.12 Though swayed by the 
policy arguments in Sarah’s favor, the court refrained from interpreting 
the statute differently, noting that Sarah’s remedy was to be found in the 
legislature, not the courts.13 
Whalen v. Whalen highlights what was a critical flaw in section 
18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes, the law governing protective orders. 
However, there is far more to the Whalen story than a court ruling and a 
legislative fix. Alaska suffers from high rates of domestic violence; a 
 
 1.  Whalen v. Whalen, 425 P.3d 150, 152 (Alaska 2018). 
 2.  Id.  
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. at 157.  
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recent survey of Alaska women found that forty percent experienced 
intimate partner violence and thirty-three percent experienced sexual 
violence, resulting in one out of two women suffering one or the other, or 
both.14 In 2017, among all states, Alaska had the highest rate at which 
women were murdered by men,15 a ranking which remained unchanged 
for the fourth straight year.16 The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention released data from 2010 to 2012, showing that 43.3% of Alaska 
women were victims of any contact sexual violence, physical violence, 
and/or stalking by an intimate partner, ranking the state second-worst 
among all states and six percentage points higher than the national 
average.17 Alaska Native women also experience domestic violence at far 
higher rates than Alaska women of other ethnicities.18 
The outcome in Whalen coupled with the aforementioned statistics 
highlighted the necessity of a legislative response to the statute’s lack of 
an extension provision. As a result, in 2019, the legislature amended 
section 18.66.100 to include an extension mechanism, and further, to 
explicitly reject the harsh outcome of Whalen.19 
The court in Whalen demonstrated considerable restraint, and its 
restraint was matched with a swift legislative response. These are both 
good principles on which to build. Yet Alaska’s struggle with domestic 
violence remains a pervasive issue, and the legislature has otherwise 
remained relatively stagnant. Reviewing the development of the domestic 
violence protective order statutory scheme can inform how the legislature 
may take more significant steps forward without the need for another 
Whalen to galvanize it into action. 
This Note addresses the Whalen decision—assessing the court’s 
 
 14.  ANDRÉ ROSAY & LAUREE MORTON, INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AND 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE STATE OF ALASKA: KEY RESULTS FROM THE 2015 ALASKA 
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2016), https://scholarworks.alaska.edu/handle/11122/ 
8103.  
 15.  VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF 2017 
HOMICIDE DATA 4 (2019), https://vpc.org/studies/wmmw2019.pdf. 
 16.  Beth Verge, Report: For Fourth Year In a Row, Alaska Has Highest Rate of Men 
Killing Women, KTUU (Last updated Sept. 19, 2019 5:07 AM), https:// 
www.ktuu.com/content/news/Report-For-fourth-year-in-a-row-Alaska-has-
highest-rate-of-men-killing-women-560736821.html. 
 17.  SHARON SMITH ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY (NISVS): 2010-2012 STATE REPORT 128 (2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/NISVS-StateReportBook.pdf. 
 18.  NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST 
AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN (2016), https:// 
www.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/american_indian_and_alaskan_native_wome
n__dv.pdf. 
 19.  An Act Relating to Protective Orders, §§ 4, 5, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 
7, 2–3. 
37.1 BUCHMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/2020  11:20 AM 
60 ALASKA LAW REVIEW 37:1 
deference, though not indifference, in the face of myriad policy 
arguments. Many lessons can be gleaned from this strict adherence to the 
separation of powers, especially considering the emotional nature of the 
issues raised. Perhaps most importantly, the decision highlights the 
important role that the legislature must play in this issue, and how the 
legislature should demonstrate leadership moving forward. 
Second, this Note analyzes the growth of section 18.66.100 and how 
its stages of development may have been impacted, perhaps even limited, 
by policy concerns unique to the realities of domestic violence. Next, this 
Note reviews approaches in other states in order to benchmark Alaska’s 
domestic violence protective order scheme. Finally, this Note addresses 
how the newest iteration of section 18.66.100 still falls short, and how the 
legislature can finally assume a leadership role by more effectively 
addressing the pervasive issue of domestic violence in Alaska. 
II. ALASKA’S PRE-WHALEN PROTECTIVE ORDER STATUTORY 
SCHEME 
Section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes governs domestic violence 
protective orders.20 The present statute is identical to the pre-Whalen 
statute, aside from the added provisions aimed at resolving the issues 
raised in Whalen.21 To be eligible for a protective order, the petitioner must 
show, by a preponderance of evidence, that the respondent committed a 
crime involving domestic violence.22 As defined in the statute, domestic 
violence is violence “by a household member against another household 
member.”23 The legislature lists these relationships as those between 
spouses, people living together, people who are dating, and people who 
have a sexual relationship,24 as well as a number of familial relationships, 
including the children of a person in an aforementioned relationship.25 
The legislature emphasized that each of these relationships need not be 
current—they merely must be shown to have existed at one point.26 
Section 18.66.990 of the Alaska Statutes enumerates a number of 
criminal offenses which satisfy the act element, including homicide, 
assault, reckless endangerment, kidnapping, sexual offenses, robbery, 
extortion, coercion, burglary, criminal trespass, arson, criminal mischief, 
 
 20.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2019). 
 21.  See infra Part VI. 
 22.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(a). 
 23.  Id. § 18.66.990(3) (2018). 
 24.  See Beth Trimmer, Comment, A Sexual Relationship, Did We Have One? A 
Review of the Definition of “Sexual Relationship” Within the Context of Alaska’s 
Domestic Violence Laws, 24  ALASKA L. REV. 237, 255–56 (2007). 
 25.  ALASKA STAT.  § 18.66.990(5) (2018). 
 26.  Id. 
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terrorist threatening, harassment, and cruelty to a pet.27 
Commission of one of the crimes involving domestic violence set 
forth in section 18.66.990, or a violation of a protective order itself, satisfies 
the act requirement for the issuance of a protective order.28 A person 
violates a protective order when he “knowingly commits or attempts to 
commit an act with reckless disregard that the act violates . . . a provision 
of the protective order.”29 The Alaska Supreme Court has clarified that 
the statute does not permit ignorance of the law as a defense.30 To prove 
a violation, the State must show that the person had notice of the 
protective order and either “recklessly disregarded a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that his conduct was prohibited by the order,” or 
knowingly committed or attempted to commit an act prohibited by the 
order.31 Lastly, the statute does not require a criminal conviction; rather, 
the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
respondent committed a criminal act.32 
Section 18.66.100 contains fifteen specific restrictions and mandates, 
any of which the court can include in a protective order, as well as a catch-
all sixteenth provision, which gives the court discretion to “order other 
relief the court determines necessary to protect the petitioner or any 
household member.”33 Enumerated options for relief include prohibitions 
against contacting the petitioner or other household members,34 entering 
vehicles owned by the petitioner,35 and going to places frequented by the 
petitioner or other household members.36 These prohibitions can also bar 
the respondent from using controlled substances.37 Furthermore, the 
order can remove and exclude the respondent from the petitioner’s 
 
 27.  Id. § 18.66.990(3)(A)–(I). 
 28.  Id. § 18.66.990(3)(G). 
 29.  Id. § 11.56.740 (2018). 
 30.  See State v. Strane, 61 P.3d 1284, 1292 (Alaska 2003) (“We thus hold that 
AS 11.56.740(a) did not require the state to prove Strane’s actual knowledge of 
illegality; instead, the statute’s culpable mental state requirement as to the 
surrounding circumstances of the offense could be met by showing that Strane 
knew of the restraining order’s existence and contents and that, so knowing, he 
recklessly disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that his conduct was 
prohibited by the order.”). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  See State v. Bingaman, 991 P.2d 227, 230 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (“[T]he 
legislature appears to consistently use the phrase ‘crimes involving domestic 
violence,’ defined in AS 18.66.990(3), in a context which indicates that the 
legislature is referring to a criminal act, not a criminal conviction.”). 
 33.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(16) (2019). 
 34.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(2). 
 35.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(5). 
 36.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(4). 
 37.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(11). 
37.1 BUCHMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/2020  11:20 AM 
62 ALASKA LAW REVIEW 37:1 
residence, regardless of the residence’s ownership.38 Lastly, only when 
the court finds that the respondent possessed a firearm during the crime 
can it direct the respondent to surrender all firearms for the duration of 
the order.39 
The court can take steps to remove children from dangerous 
situations, as the statute permits the court to award temporary custody to 
the petitioner.40 The statute also enables the court to order the respondent 
to partake in alcohol-abuse treatment and participate in a rehabilitative 
program for the perpetrators of domestic violence, serving as powerful 
tools to begin correcting the root causes of these crimes.41 
The statute’s financial provisions enable the court to order the 
respondent to pay for the petitioner’s shelter, medical expenses, 
counseling, property damage, and other costs incurred as a result of the 
domestic violence.42 
The aforementioned provisions laid out in section 18.66.100(c) are all 
in effect for one year—or less if dissolved by the court—aside from 
provisions of a protective order issued under subsection 18.66.100(c)(1), 
which are “effective until further order of the court.”43 This indefinite 
provision “prohibit[s] the respondent from threatening to commit or 
committing domestic violence, stalking, or harassment.”44 
Whereas protective orders are sought as a civil remedy, the violation 
of a protective order is a Class A Misdemeanor,45 punishable by a $25,000 
fine46 and a maximum of one year imprisonment.47 Moreover, violating a 
protective order triggers section 18.65.530 of the Alaska Statutes, under 
which the responding officer, upon a finding of probable cause, is 
required to arrest the offender.48 
III. WHALEN V. WHALEN 
The protective order statutory scheme remained largely untouched 
until it found the spotlight of the Alaska Supreme Court’s scrutiny. The 
legislature’s opportunity to adjust the existing protective order statute 
 
 38.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(3). 
 39.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(6)–(7). 
 40.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(9). 
 41.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(15). 
 42.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(13)–(14). 
 43.  Id. § 18.66.100(b). 
 44.  Id. § 18.66.100(c)(1). 
 45.  Id. § 11.56.740 (2018). 
 46.  Id. § 12.55.035(b)(5) (2018). 
 47.  Id. § 12.55.135(a) (2018). 
 48.  Id. § 18.65.530(a)(2) (2018). 
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was highlighted in Whalen v. Whalen, decided in August of 2018.49 To 
understand the options still available to the legislature, as well as the 
reforms ultimately pursued in 2019, it is first important to illustrate in 
what sense the court’s hands were tied in Whalen. As an initial matter, the 
court disagreed with Sarah, the appellant, and held that section 18.66.100 
of the Alaska Statutes did not permit a court to issue a protective order 
where there was no new incident of domestic violence.50 The court based 
its ruling on two grounds. 
First, the court applied the theory of res judicata.51 When a claim has 
been fully litigated and the court makes a final and valid judgment on the 
claim’s merits, res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the parties from 
litigating the claim again.52 Thus, the court framed the issue as whether 
or not “Sarah [was] attempting to receive a second judgment on a claim 
that she has previously asserted.”53 Reasoning that the September 2014 
protective order satisfied the elements of claim preclusion—a judgment 
between the same parties that is valid, final, and on the merits—the court 
determined that Sarah’s claim was extinguished.54 
The court found Sarah’s two arguments opposing the applicability 
of res judicata unpersuasive. Her first argument, that domestic violence 
is an abatable condition and thus similar to a temporary nuisance, carried 
little weight.55 A temporary nuisance claim permits a new cause of action 
each time there is an invasion.56 However, a new invasion had not 
occurred, and if it had, section 18.66.100 would have clearly applied.57 Her 
second argument relied on McComas v. Kirn58—another case in which res 
judicata was raised in relation to a protective order.59 However, in 
McComas, the court found that the circumstances had materially changed, 
and so the claim was not truly being relitigated.60 This exception did not 
apply to Sarah’s case because her circumstances had not materially 
 
 49.  425 P.3d 150 (Alaska 2018). 
 50.  Id. at 155. 
 51.  Id. at 154. 
 52.  See id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(1) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1982)) (“‘When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of 
the plaintiff[,] . . . [t]he plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the 
original claim or any part thereof, although [s]he may be able to maintain an 
action upon the judgment.’”).  
 53.  Id. at 154. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  105 P.3d 1130 (Alaska 2005). 
 59.  Whalen, 425 P.3d at 154. 
 60.  Id. at 154–55. 
37.1 BUCHMAN FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/6/2020  11:20 AM 
64 ALASKA LAW REVIEW 37:1 
changed.61 
Second, the court based its holding on the statute’s language and 
history. The court noted that the legislature undoubtedly contemplated a 
renewal process; the legislature had set durational limitations for many 
of the statute’s provisions but it had also allowed subsection (c)(1), 
prohibiting acts or threats of domestic violence, to persist indefinitely at 
the discretion of the judge.62 The court reasoned that these durational 
specifications demonstrated the legislature’s intent to limit these orders 
to the one-year timeframe.63 Furthermore, given that the original six-
month time limit was doubled in 2004, the court posited that the 
legislature could have provided for a renewal process, but that it had 
eschewed such a process in favor of a longer duration.64 Most 
importantly, the court noted that the legislature completely eliminated 
the extension provision when it passed the 1996 Domestic Violence 
Prevention and Victim Protection Act.65 Therefore, the absence of such a 
provision in section 18.66.100, coupled with the legislature’s ample 
opportunity and apparent decision not to institute a renewal process, led 
the court to believe that the legislature never intended for a protective 
order to be issued absent a new incident of domestic violence.66 
Sarah and the amici also pointed to committee hearings, during 
which legislators seemed to indicate a presumption that the statute 
allowed for renewals.67 Nonetheless, the court refused to “rewrite the law 
to conform to a mistaken view of the law that the legislature had when it 
amended the statute.”68 Highlighting the legislature’s role in setting 
policy, the court determined that the absence of a renewal provision was 
a policy choice, concluding that “[i]t is not the court’s role or prerogative 
to modify the legislature’s policy decision.”69 
The court’s decision meant that Sarah would go without a protective 
order until either the legislature amended the law or she suffered another 
incident of domestic violence. While legislative action was hardly out of 
 
 61.  Id. at 155. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  See id. (“[T]he language of the statute unambiguously provides for the 
duration of the various kinds of protective relief that can be ordered.”). 
 64.  See id. at 155–56 (“Those specific time limits were expanded by the 2004 
legislation. If the legislature intended to allow for multiple protective orders from 
the same incident of domestic violence, it did not say so in the statute.”). 
 65.  Id. at 155. 
 66.  See id. at 157 (“Here the legislature enacted an unambiguous statute with 
a clear time limit—originally six months then later one year—and it did so while 
replacing a statute that permitted an extension. It is not the court’s role or 
prerogative to modify the legislature’s policy decision.”). 
 67.  Id. at 156; see also infra Part V. 
 68.  Whalen, 425 P.3d at 155. 
 69.  Id. at 157.  
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the question, the difficult decision trapped Sarah in an impossible 
situation, sparking two of the five members of the court to join in a 
dissenting opinion.70 
Joined by Justice Winfree, Justice Maassen argued in his dissenting 
opinion that neither the statute nor res judicata should have tied the 
court’s hands.71 Res judicata, wrote Justice Maassen, applies in a civil suit, 
where a party is injured, receives compensation for the injury, and is thus 
barred from bringing the same claim against the same defendant.72 By 
applying the doctrine, the majority had denied the second step in the 
petition process: the judge’s discretion to grant the order.73 Once the court 
finds that the respondent committed an act of domestic violence against 
the petitioner, the claim has not run its course, as it would have in a civil 
case.74 The second step to granting a protective order, Justice Maassen 
pointed out, involves the judge exercising his discretion to determine 
whether the order should be granted.75 This discretion is rooted in the 
statute’s fundamental purpose, which is to protect the petitioner; 
punishing the respondent is a means to an end, not the end itself.76 And 
unlike a civil case, in which the claim is complete when the judgment is 
issued and damages are awarded, the question of whether protection is 
still necessary beyond the first year is not answered in the original 
protective order.77 All the original order determined was that the 
petitioner needed protection at that moment, not a year into the future.78 
Therefore, “[b]ecause that claim was not and could not have been litigated 
in 2017, the doctrine of res judicata, by definition, cannot apply.”79 
Additionally, the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s 
reading of section 18.66.100. They first noted that, while the legislature 
had not explicitly allowed multiple protective orders to derive from the 
same incident of domestic violence, neither had it explicitly denied that 
numerous protective orders could be granted based on a single incident.80 
 
 70.  Id. at 158. 
 71.  Id. (Maassen, J., dissenting). 
 72.  Id. at 159. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See id. (“[A] domestic violence petition is thus much different from, say, a 
claim for the tort of assault, in which the plaintiff is awarded compensation for a 
past wrong and then closes the books on it forever.”). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  See id. (“It is a ‘protective order,’ intended not only to acknowledge a past 
bad act on the part of the respondent but also, and primarily, to protect the 
petitioner from future harm.”). 
 77.  See id. (“A domestic violence petitioner is seeking ongoing protection, not 
compensation for a past wrong.”). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 158.  
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As for the one-year time limit on most provisions, the dissenting justices 
viewed that as an indication of when a review of the provisions’ efficacy 
should take place.81 Subsection (b)(2), which restricts the provisions to one 
year, “simply assures that there will be a new judicial review . . . 
requir[ing] a petitioner to return to court to justify the continuation of 
such extraordinary restrictions if, after a year has passed, she still requires 
protection.”82 
Though the dissent is persuasive, reading into the statute a 
mechanism for extending a protective order nonetheless would have 
usurped the legislature’s role as the lawmaking body. Between 
potentially overstepping its role and limiting itself perhaps beyond what 
was necessary, the court chose the latter, sending a message to the 
legislature that the courts would not rewrite laws that were poorly 
written to begin with. 
Domestic violence is terrible. That is not up for debate. The 
emotional nature of the problem would have compelled judicial action 
perhaps more than any other case decided in the 2018 term. Yet the court 
chose restraint. This choice was a testament to the principles 
underpinning the separation of powers. Sarah Whalen deserved a better 
outcome, but the court’s role was not to rewrite the law to ensure such an 
outcome. A decision in the alternative may have done just that, and while 
that outcome in the instant case would have been more suitable, the 
foundations which separate the branches of government would have been 
weakened. To understand the legislative folly leading to the Whalen 
decision, it is important to investigate the legislative history of the 
protective order statutory scheme. 
IV. PRIOR VERSIONS OF THE STATUTE 
Alaska’s modern protective order statutory scheme is rooted in its 
predecessor, section 25.35.010 of the Alaska Statutes.83 This previous 
iteration was quite different, though many of the injunctive and monetary 
relief provisions carried over to the present version.84 The most glaring 
differences were in the duration of the order and, critically, the ability to 
renew the order at the petitioner’s request.85 The original orders lasted at 
most ninety days—a far cry from today’s year-long timeframe, or the 
indefinite section 18.66.100(c)(1) provision.86 With that said, section 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  ALASKA STAT. § 25.35.010 (repealed 1996). 
 84.  Compare id., with ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100 (2019). 
 85.  Id. § 25.35.010. 
 86.  Id. § 25.35.010(c). 
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25.35.010 did contain a renewal procedure, granting the court the 
authority to extend the injunctive relief provisions another forty-five days 
if necessary.87 
In 1996, the Alaska legislature passed the Domestic Violence 
Prevention and Victim Protection Act (“1996 Act”),88 overhauling the 
protective order statutory scheme.89 Why the extension provision was 
eliminated from the 1996 Act is not immediately clear, though striking a 
reasonable balance between the petitioner’s protection and the 
respondent’s rights seemed to play an important role. Throughout the 
various committee hearings on the 1996 bill, increasing the length of time 
of orders and removing the extension provision were scarcely covered 
topics. However, one key portion of the minutes does seem to encapsulate 
a critical viewpoint regarding the balancing of rights and protection. Co-
Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, Senator Rick Halford, while 
discussing the property rights of respondents, noted his concern for the 
potential violation of individuals’ constitutional rights, though he 
thought such violations were acceptable so long as the orders were 
absolutely necessary and limited in duration.90 
Without placing too much weight on Halford’s ability to influence 
the legislation, it is critical to note that Halford, a Republican, was the 
Senate Majority leader during 1996, and he had served as the President of 
the Senate from 1994 to 1995.91 It stands to reason that his concern over 
the “trampling of constitutional rights” was not an isolated viewpoint, 
and the fact that he voiced his opinion on the issue indicates that 
legislation which tipped the balance too far against the respondent may 
not have even made it to a vote, at least not under his leadership. While 
the minutes do not offer definitive answers as to why the extension 
provision was eliminated, Senator Halford’s concerns should not be 
dismissed as the ruminations of a lone senator, but perhaps viewed 
instead as the opinion of a large contingent of the legislative body. 
V. RELEVANT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
The only significant amendment to section 18.66.100 of the Alaska 
Statutes prior to Whalen occurred in 2004, when the legislature doubled 
 
 87.  Id. § 25.35.010(c). 
 88.  Domestic Violence Prevention and Victim Protection Act, 1996 Alaska 
Sess. Laws ch. 64. 
 89.  See id.  
 90.  Hearing on H.B. 314, S. FIN. COMM., MINUTES, 19th Leg. (May 5, 1996) 
(comments of Sen. Rick Halford). 
 91.  22nd Alaska State Legislature Senator Rick Halford (R) President of the Senate, 
ALASKA REPUBLICANS, http://www.akrepublicans.org/pastlegs/22ndleg/bio-
halford.shtml (last visited April 19, 2020). 
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the time limit of most of the protective order provisions from six months 
to twelve months.92 The 2004 amendment was introduced by Senator 
Hollis French in Senate Bill 308 (“SB 308”).93 In the first committee hearing 
for SB 308, Senator French summarized the comparable statutes in other 
states, noting: 
[J]ust five states have long-term domestic violence protective 
orders that have a shorter time period than Alaska. Three have 
the same six-month maximum period and the 40 other states 
have increased the length of time to a year and beyond. In this 
bill we would set the time frame at one year. It’s an incremental 
step and I think it’s a reasonable balance between an order that 
never ends and an order that is too short of a duration.94 
It is telling that Senator French introduced SB 308 with this 
statement. First, it demonstrates that the primary factor motivating the 
bill was that the length of Alaska’s protective order provisions lagged 
behind those of most other states. Additionally, it shows that the 
legislature attempted to strike a “reasonable balance” between the 
petitioner’s security and the rights of the respondent. Longer or even 
permanent orders could have deprived the respondent of certain rights 
and liberties; similarly, the ability to renew an order without new 
incidents of domestic violence was perhaps deemed inimical to striking a 
balance between the interests of the petitioner and the rights of the 
respondent. 
It is also likely that the senators did not realize that a petitioner could 
not renew the protective order given that they discussed the prospect of 
renewals on numerous occasions. At one point, Senator Gretchen Guess 
stated that if, at the end of a six month restraining order, continued 
protection was warranted, then a petitioner could simply seek another 
order.95 Senator French agreed, noting that someone whose relationship 
issues continued up to the six month mark could simply have the order 
extended.96 At a later hearing, Senator French framed the lengthening 
from six months to one year as a cost-saving measure given the frequency 
at which courts must renew orders, and he highlighted specific examples 
 
 92.  Act of June 29, 2004, § 23, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124, 12. 
 93.  See Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. 
(Mar. 11, 2004) (comments of Sen. Hollis French) (extending the order to one year 
assures “longer protection to petitioners who are seeking protection from an 
abuser”). The substance of this amendment was ultimately passed in SB 170. Act 
of June 29, 2004, § 23, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124, 12. 
 94.  Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. 
(Mar. 11, 2004) (comments of Sen. Hollis French). 
 95.  Id. at 16 (comments of Sen. Gretchen Guess). 
 96.  Id. (comments of Sen. Hollis French). 
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of petitioners who sought numerous orders because of continuing issues 
with respondents.97 
The court in Whalen argued that these exchanges demonstrated the 
senators’ awareness of the lack of a renewal provision, because their use 
of “refile” and “extended” was in the context of “lingering issues,” 
implying that these new protective orders were supported by new 
incidents of domestic violence.98 
More likely, though, the senators did not realize that the statute’s 
wording would, fifteen years later, be interpreted to require a new 
incident of domestic violence. As the dissent in Whalen pointed out, the 
legislature “did not say it intended to prohibit ‘multiple protective orders 
from the same incident of domestic violence,’ which it could easily have 
done had it intended that result.”99 In all likelihood, the dissent’s analysis 
of the legislative history is correct. To read into the legislative history an 
explicit requirement of a new incident of domestic violence seems a 
bridge too far based on the scant deliberations. 
There is also a significant likelihood that the legislature may have 
been dissuaded from adopting a new extension mechanism because of the 
desire to strike a “reasonable balance” between the petitioner’s safety and 
the respondent’s rights. The focus on such a balance shows that the 
legislature may not have intended to allow renewals in the absence of a 
new incident of domestic violence. At one hearing, a member of the 
public, James Dieringer III, contended that he was “that 10 to 15 percent 
of the men who have been abused by this system” and that five protective 
orders were issued against him “as a tool to gain custody, child support, 
possession of the home, those kinds of things.”100 
Notably Dieringer’s testimony foreshadowed the very issue raised 
in Whalen. He requested that the senators revisit the probable cause 
standard, condemning the court’s apparent ability to find probable cause 
to issue new orders based solely on the acts which justified the original 
order.101 Barbara Brink, the Director of the Alaska Public Defender 
Agency, expressed similar concerns.102 She added that the amendment 
paternalistically required the court to issue one-year orders, and that she 
 
 97.  Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. (Mar. 
26, 2004) (comments of Sen. Hollis French). 
 98.  See Whalen v. Whalen, 425 P.3d 150, 156 (Alaska 2018) (“This 
understanding is consistent with allowing additional orders only when the prior 
order has been violated or when a new incident of domestic violence has 
occurred.”). 
 99.  Id. at 158. 
 100.  Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. (Mar. 26, 
2004) (comments of James Dierenger III). 
 101.  Id. at 26. 
 102.  Id. at 27 (comments of Barbara Brink). 
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was far more amenable to giving the judge the discretion to grant an order 
of six months and up to one year.103 
These concerns were not lost on the Committee. Responding to 
Dieringer’s complaints regarding the court’s ability to reuse past acts of 
domestic violence to justify multiple orders, Senator Scott Ogan remarked 
that it could be a good idea to revisit, and potentially increase, the 
probable cause requirement applicable to the protective orders.104 Senator 
Ralph Seekins, Chairman of the Committee, reflected that he was aware 
of attorneys who abused the protective order system to gain leverage 
during divorce proceedings.105 Later, Senator Ogan proposed 
Amendment 2, which would have required petition forms to “contain a 
conspicuous warning that the petitions and requests are submitted under 
oath under penalty of perjury and that a person making a false statement 
may be prosecuted for perjury and, if found guilty, may be punished for 
violation of a felony.”106 The Senate Judiciary Committee did in fact adopt 
the amendment.107 Though it was not ultimately included in the final 
version of the bill,108 its adoption speaks to the importance placed on the 
respondent’s liberty. Clearly, a desire to ensure some level of protection 
for the respondent influenced these proceedings. 
Interestingly, the Whalen court refrained from highlighting these 
policy concerns. A likely explanation can be found in Dierenger’s 
statement, in which he confessed, “I’m kind of embarrassed to be here 
today. I’m very nervous to be here.”109 Simply put, many people still 
believe that discussing domestic violence is taboo.110 Considering the 
harshness of the court’s ruling, a discussion of an abuser’s rights and 
liberties likely was not deemed the most tactful or persuasive approach. 
The 2004 amendment to section 18.66.100 of the Alaska Statutes 
could be characterized as concise, narrow, and perfunctory. While the 
legislature demonstrated some awareness of Alaska’s domestic protective 
order statute in relation to other states, legislators failed to engage with 
the language of the statute beyond the basic discussions regarding an 
 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 26 (comments of Sen. Scott Ogan). 
 105.  Id. (comments of Sen. Ralph Seekins). 
 106.  Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. (Apr. 7, 
2004) (comments of Sen. Scott Ogan). 
 107.  SB 308, 23rd Leg., 2d Sess. (2004). 
 108.  See Act of June 29, 2004, § 23, 2004 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 124, 12 (not 
including the amendment in the final text). 
 109.  Hearing on S.B. 308, ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COM. MINUTES, 23d Leg. (Mar. 26, 
2004) (comments of James Dierenger III). 
 110.  ALLSTATE FOUNDATION, 2018 NATIONAL POLL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
FINANCIAL ABUSE 26 (2018) (finding that 1 in 3 people think discussing domestic 
violence is taboo, up ten percent since 2014). 
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order’s length. Perhaps the desire to strike a reasonable balance between 
the parties’ interests and rights dissuaded legislators from taking a more 
aggressive approach to the amendment, and interestingly enough, this 
policy concern did dominate much of the deliberations. Yet, despite 
touching on the issue of an extension mechanism, the legislature chose to 
limit its focus to the length of the original order. It is clear that the 
amendment failed to address the issue that would later surface in Whalen. 
VI. POST-WHALEN AMENDMENT 
In 2019, the Alaska legislature once again amended section 18.66.100 
of the Alaska Statutes.111 State Representative Chuck Kopp, the prime 
sponsor for House Bill 12 (“HB 12”), remarked that this amendment was 
a direct response—a fix—to the Whalen decision.112  Representative Kopp 
set forth the bill’s core purpose, which was to allow “victims that already 
have a long term protective order to request an extension of that order 
within thirty days of it expiring or up to sixty days after it has expired.”113 
Further, Representative Kopp noted that HB 12 sought to specifically 
address the Whalen decision, allowing court’s to grant extensions based 
on the petitioner’s continuing fear rather than a new incident of domestic 
violence.114 
Compared to the 2004 amendment, which sought to address 
imprecise and complicated policy goals—preventing domestic violence 
and aligning Alaska’s domestic violence protective order statutory 
scheme with a perceived standard gleaned from statutes across the 
nation—the 2019 amendment was a more intentional, targeted response 
to a readily identifiable problem. Thus, rather than legislators and 
witnesses struggling to unravel the conundrum of domestic violence, the 
witnesses were able to address the specific issue of the lack of an extension 
mechanism in section 18.66.100. As a result, deliberations were more 
illuminating, and the concept of striking a “reasonable balance” was not 
nearly the detractor that it proved to be during the 2004 amendment 
process. 
The legislature heard public testimony from leaders in the field of 
domestic violence prevention in Alaska. Their insight shed light on the 
practical reverberations of the Whalen decision. Teryn Bird, an attorney 
representing victims of domestic violence, emphasized that at least one 
court, the Fourth Judicial District in Fairbanks, re-issued orders without 
 
 111.  An Act Relating to Protective Orders, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 7. 
 112.  Hearing on H.B. 12, H. STATE AFFAIRS COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st Leg. (Feb. 
28, 2019) (comments of Rep. Chuck Kopp at 3:10:32 PM). 
 113.  Id. (comments of Rep. Chuck Kopp at 3:13:53 PM). 
 114.  Id. 
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requiring a finding of a new act of domestic violence.115 The Whalen 
decision abruptly ended this practice.116 Bird revealed that “countless 
clients” have been affected by the Whalen decision.117 She recounted the 
story of one family who, after the expiration of a year-long protective 
order, continued to suffer a perpetrator’s constant intimidation.118 His 
acts did not rise to a crime or threat of domestic violence, but because of 
the expiration of the year-long protective order, the family would have to 
be “re-victimized if they ever want to be provided the same opportunity 
to heal and feel protected.”119 
Christine Pate of the Alaska Network on Domestic Violence and 
Sexual Assault (ANDVSA) reiterated that there was considerable 
confusion among lower courts regarding the prospect of issuing 
extensions.120 Like Bird, Pate testified that judges in various regions of 
Alaska interpreted their level of discretion differently, so that some courts 
frequently granted new orders without requiring new incidents of 
domestic violence while others did not.121 Pate additionally illustrated 
how the Whalen decision confounded an already horrific situation for 
victims. With only one, year-long order to protect them, victims were 
“forced to make impossible strategic decisions as to when to apply for a 
protection order so as to maximize their safety.”122 The House Judiciary 
Committee subsequently held a hearing for HB 12, and public testimony 
again attracted numerous leaders in the domestic violence prevention 
field, all of whom highlighted the struggles endured by victims following 
the Whalen decision.123 
Unlike in 2004, the legislators did not dwell on the rights of the 
respondent. Perhaps this was due to a change in times. More likely, 
however, is that the Whalen trigger cabined the deliberations. The notion 
that another order would require a new incident of domestic violence is 
shocking, and rectifying that outcome would hardly support a review of 
how the fix would impact respondents. In fact, such a discussion would 
be tasteless. On the other hand, the 2004 deliberations involved a 
 
 115.  Hearing on H.B. 12, H. STATE AFFAIRS STANDING COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st 
Leg. (Mar. 7, 2019) (comments of Teryn Bird at 4:10:14 PM). 
 116.  See id. (“That remedy has been removed, leaving victims of egregious and 
lethal crimes without protection unless re-victimized in a way that is recognized 
as a crime by the State of Alaska.”). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id at 4:11:02 PM. 
 119.  Id. at 4:12:10 PM. 
 120.  Id. (comments of Christine Pate at 4:13:33 PM). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. at 4:15:54 PM 
 123.  See Hearing on H.B. 12, H. JUDICIARY STANDING COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st 
Leg. (Mar. 18, 2019) (public testimony at 1:56:30 PM) (testimony reiterating the 
multitude of problems created by the Whalen decision). 
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doubling of the order’s fairly invasive restraints, and unlike in 2019, the 
deliberations were not prompted by any event in particular, especially 
not an event like the Whalen decision. 
Yet, the respondent’s rights were nonetheless still present during 
these hearings. During public testimony, two members of the public did 
bemoan the burdens faced by respondents;124 however, it does not appear 
that legislators grappled vocally with these brief comments, at least not 
during the hearing, and especially not to the degree that they had 
discussed Dierenger’s 2004 testimony.125 
At two other moments during hearings, legislators did discuss the 
interests of the respondent. The first instance occurred during the March 
7 hearing, when Representative Sarah Vance wondered what protections 
were in place for those who felt they were wrongly accused of domestic 
violence.126 Maggie Humm of the Alaska Legal Services Corporation 
replied that respondents should receive notice of the proceedings, have a 
right to be heard during the proceedings, and be able to appeal the 
issuance of a protective order.127 
Later, in a March 18 Judiciary Committee hearing, the discussion 
shifted to the duration of sexual assault and stalking protective orders.128 
After Representative Gabrielle LeDoux queried whether Representative 
Kopp believed it was wise to increase sexual assault and stalking 
protective orders from six months to one year, Representative Kopp 
replied that he was conflicted because he wanted to balance “protect[ing] 
people as long as possible” with avoiding violations of individuals’ 
liberty.129 Representative Kopp’s comments echoed the sentiment that 
persisted throughout the 2004 amendment process, though that sentiment 
hardly affected these deliberations. Unlike in 2004, the drafters of this 
amendment set out to solve a specific problem, a problem that was 
deemed anathema to the statute’s core purpose, and perhaps a broader 
discussion of the respondent’s liberty would have been inappropriate 
given these circumstances. Ultimately, HB 12 was enacted in June 2019.130 
 
 124.  See id. (testimony of Robin Mitchell and Adam Fletcher at 2:06:10 PM) 
(describing struggles faced by respondents of domestic violence protective 
orders). 
 125.  See id.; supra Part V. 
 126.  Hearing on H.B. 12, H. STATE AFFAIRS STANDING COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st 
Leg. (Mar. 7, 2019) (comments of Representative Sarah Vance at 4:20:05 PM). 
 127.  Id. (comments of Maggie Humm at 4:22:05 PM).  
 128.  Hearing on H.B. 12, H. JUDICIARY STANDING COMM. AUDIO TAPES, 31st Leg. 
(Mar. 18, 2019) (introduced by Rep. Chuck Kopp at 1:33:16 PM). 
 129.  Id. at 2:21:33 PM. 
 130.  An Act Relating to Protective Orders, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 7. 
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VI. CURRENT STATUTE AND JUDICIAL TREATMENT 
The following reflect the changes to section 18.66.100(e) of the Alaska 
Statutes: 
(e) A court may not deny a petition for a protective order under 
this section solely because 
(1) there is of a lapse of time between an act of domestic 
violence and the filing of the petition; 
(2) the act of domestic violence was the basis for a previous 
protective order; or 
(3) a court previously found that the incident was a crime 
of domestic violence committed against the petitioner but 
declined to order relief under this section, if the petition 
alleges a change in circumstances since the court’s previous 
finding.131 
Furthermore, the legislature added a new subsection to provide for 
a renewal mechanism: 
(f) Within 30 days before, or within 60 days after, the expiration 
of a protective order issued or extended under (b)(2) of this 
section, a petitioner may petition the court for an extension of 
the protective order. The court shall schedule a hearing and 
provide at least 10 days’ notice to the respondent of the hearing 
and of the respondent’s right to appear and be heard, either in 
person or through an attorney. If the court finds that an 
extension of the provisions of the order is necessary to protect 
the petitioner from domestic violence, regardless of whether the 
respondent appears at the hearing, the court may extend the 
provisions of the order. An extension granted under this 
subsection is effective for one year unless earlier dissolved by 
court order. If the court grants an extension before the protective 
order expires, the extension takes effect on the day the protective 
order would have expired.132 
The legislature solved the Whalen issue using a two-pronged 
approach. First, the legislature, in subsection (e)(3), explicitly rejected the 
notion that a new order could not be granted even if it was based on the 
same act of domestic violence—in other words, the exact issue posed in 
 
 131.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(e) (2018); An Act Relating to Protective Orders, 
§ 4, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 7, 2. Additions are in bold italics, and deletions are 
indicated with strikethroughs. 
 132.  An Act Relating to Protective Orders, § 5, 2019 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 7, 2–
3. 
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Whalen.133 Second, the legislature included subsection (f), which provides 
for an extension mechanism.134 While not explicitly at issue in Whalen, this 
extension provision would have resolved Sarah Whalen’s dilemma 
because such an extension would not require proof of additional acts 
other than those that served as the basis for the original order. 
Shortly after the amendment, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled in 
Mitchell v. Mitchell135 that the legislature had adequately solved the issue 
that the court had highlighted in Whalen.136 Yet, despite this limited fix, a 
survey of other states demonstrates that Alaska can nonetheless improve 
on section 18.66.100, tackling issues well beyond the addition of the 
renewal mechanism, a mechanism that should have been included in the 
statute to begin with. 
VII. PROTECTIVE ORDER STATUTES IN OTHER STATES 
Should the Alaska legislature see fit to further exercise its 
“prerogative to make any policy changes to the statute,”137 protective 
order statutes in other states offer a roadmap for change. This Section 
distills the wide variety of statutes into a few categories. It begins by 
inspecting the discretionary model. Then, the Section moves on to discuss 
forms of extensions. Then the Section assesses the less common hybrid 
and permanent approaches. Lastly, this Section culminates with an 
overview of how firearms are treated in these statutes. 
A. Discretionary Model 
Some statutes, such as North Dakota’s, give the court the discretion 
to grant a protective order for however long it deems necessary to protect 
the petitioner.138 North Dakota’s statute does not contain time limitations 
for its remedial provisions. Instead, the North Dakota Supreme Court has 
interpreted the statute to give the court full discretion to set the length of 
the order, even allowing for indefinite orders, so long as the length of the 
 
 133.  § 18.66.100(e)(3); An Act Relating to Protective Orders, § 4, 2019 Alaska 
Sess. Laws ch. 7, 2. 
 134.  § 18.66.100(f); An Act Relating to Protective Orders, § 5, 2019 Alaska Sess. 
Laws ch. 7, 2–3. 
 135.  445 P.3d 660 (Alaska 2019). 
 136.  See id. at 664 (Alaska 2019) (acknowledging that the legislature, by 
amending the law on protective orders, had clarified the issue addressed in 
Whalen and granted courts the authority to issue additional long term protective 
orders relying on the same conduct that served as a basis for the original order). 
 137.  Whalen v. Whalen, 425 P.3d 150, 156 (Alaska 2018). 
 138.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02 (2019). 
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order is “reasonable under the facts of each particular case.”139 
Additionally, North Dakota’s statute permits the court to grant an order 
“upon a showing of actual or imminent domestic violence.”140 This 
standard enables the court to grant an order based solely on the 
petitioner’s fear, rather than, as a threshold matter, requiring a past act; 
however, the court does hold petitioners to an exacting standard, which, 
in practice, likely requires evidence of past abuse.141 
Hawaii’s statute is similar to North Dakota’s, except that, instead of 
leaving the issue of discretion to the judiciary, the legislature explicitly 
provided courts with the discretion to grant an order for a “fixed 
reasonable period as the court deems appropriate.”142 
Vermont’s statute is perhaps the most interesting of the three 
discretionary models assessed in this Note.143 The injunctive relief 
available is not limited in the statute, except that the length of the order 
must “be granted for a fixed period.”144 However, the court does not have 
discretion as to whether to grant the order; instead, the legislature 
mandates that the court grant an order if it “finds that the defendant has 
abused the plaintiff,” and if “there is a danger of further abuse.”145 In fact, 
the Vermont Supreme Court has taken this mandate to nullify any res 
judicata arguments.146 
These discretionary models do have drawbacks, largely in that they 
offer unpredictable protection. Giving the court broad discretion to set the 
length of the protective order could lead to unfairly detrimental outcomes 
for both the petitioner and the respondent. For the abused, a lack of 
uniformity could mean a lack of protection. As an empirical matter, 
academics have found that courts “trivialize[] domestic violence cases,”147 
and that the “history of domestic violence is not properly considered in 
cases of child custody, child support, and visitation.”148 In the child 
 
 139.  Rinas v. Engelhardt, 818 N.W.2d 767, 771 (N.D. 2012). 
 140.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-02(4) (2019). 
 141.  See Niska v. Falconer, 824 N.W.2d 778, 782 (N.D. 2012) (“[P]ast abusive 
behavior and the context and history of the parties’ relationship are relevant 
factors in determining whether domestic violence is actual or imminent.”). 
 142.  HAW. REV. STAT. § 586-5.5(a) (2019). 
 143.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1103 (2019). 
 144.  Id. § 1103(d).  
 145.  Id. § 1103(c)(1)–(c)(1)(A). 
 146.  See Woodward v. Woodward, No. 12-113, 2012 Vt. Unpub. LEXIS 125, at 
*6 (Vt. Sept. 26, 2012) (“[W]e reject defendant’s suggestion that mother was 
precluded from raising instances of abuse cited in the earlier RFA proceeding and 
could not obtain a new RFA order unless she proved new abuse by defendant 
since the initial order issued.”). 
 147.  Jeannette F. Swent, Gender Bias at the Heart of Justice: An Empirical Study of 
State Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1, 56 (1996). 
 148.  Id. at 57 tbl.1 (describing the results presented in a table that nine of the 
fourteen states studied found domestic violence did not play a major role when 
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support context, complete discretion tends to lead to inconsistent 
outcomes and lower support awards.149 Victims of domestic violence 
suffer from bias inside and outside the courtroom,150 so providing 
guidelines to judges as they determine the length of orders could ensure 
added protection. 
Respondents to protective orders face significant bias as well. 
Unfortunately, there exist few studies that shed any light on how the 
respondents face bias; however, case-by-case, qualitative examples 
demonstrate the phenomenon. In North Dakota, the supreme court had 
to modify a protective order down from twenty years to five years.151 
Some argue that Hawaii and Vermont, due to the considerable deference 
given to the trial judges, suffer from a lack of clarity when it comes to 
formulating the length of protective orders.152 Undoubtedly, the wide 
discretion afforded to these judges, coupled with bias, could lead to 
wildly unpredictable results.153 
B. Fixed-Limit Extension Model 
Some states fix the duration of orders but provide for an extension 
mechanism. Alaska’s current statute is categorized as a fixed-limit 
extension model.154 These mechanisms come in a variety of forms. Some 
states apply an objective reasonableness standard to determine whether 
 
considering child custody, child support, and visitation). 
 149.  Jane K. Stoever, Enjoining Abuse: The Case for Indefinite Domestic Violence 
Protection Orders, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1015, 1083–84 (2014). 
 150.  See generally Wendy L. Patrick, Ph.D., How Social Stigma Silences Domestic 
Violence Victims, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Apr 9, 2018), https:// 
www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/why-bad-looks-good/201804/ how-
social-stigma-silences-domestic-violence-victims (explaining why victims of 
domestic violence often remain silent); ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD: SEXUAL 
ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, AND POLICING (2015), https://www.aclu.org/ 
report/sexual-assault-domestic-violence-and-policing (summarizing 
recommendations and stories by practitioners who work with survivors of 
domestic violence); Kristine Phillips, ‘Intolerable’: Judge Reprimanded After She 
‘Berated and Belittled’ Domestic-Violence Victim, WASH. POST, (Sept. 1, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/09/01/ 
intolerable-judge-reprimanded-after-she-berated-and-belittled-domestic-
violence-victim/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6bcc8286ef4b (reprimanding a 
judge under the state’s code of judicial conduct after she “berated” and “belittled” 
a woman, using “sarcastic” language throughout the hearing). 
 151.  Rinas v. Engelhardt, 818 N.W.2d 767, 771–72 (N.D. 2012). 
 152.  Dana Harrington Conner, Civil Protection Order Duration: Proof Procedural 
Issues, and Policy Considerations, 24 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 343, 351–
52 (2015).  
 153.  See id. at 349–52 (discussing how the lack of guidance and considerable 
discretion enjoyed by judges in states that have adopted a discretionary model 
can lead to unpredictable outcomes). 
 154.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(f) (2019). 
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an order should be extended. California, for instance, limits initial orders 
to a maximum of five years, but the statute allows the orders to be 
renewed based on such a standard.155 The renewals can last an additional 
five years, or they can be made permanent.156 The standard for renewals, 
set forth in Ritchie v. Konrad,157 is quite lenient: the trial court “should 
grant a requested extension unless the request is contested and the judge 
determines the protected party does not entertain a ‘reasonable 
apprehension’ of future abusive conduct.”158 The court in Ritchie 
emphasized that “it is unnecessary, however, to find [whether] any abuse 
has occurred since issuance of the initial protective order.”159 Ohio 
adopted a similar standard, requiring a trial court to find “that petitioner 
has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that petitioner or 
petitioner’s family or household members are in danger of domestic 
violence.”160 Utah has adopted a similar approach.161 The statute 
mandates that a judge must find a “substantial likelihood of abuse or 
domestic violence.”162 In Bailey v. Bayles,163 the Utah Court of Appeals 
established that, in petitions for permanent protective orders, the 
substantial likelihood test equated to whether there was “a present fear 
of future abuse,” emphasizing that the “present fear” must be 
“reasonable.”164 Minnesota codified a reasonableness standard in its test 
for prohibiting the respondent from possessing firearms.165 
Some states require evidence that the order was violated in order to 
extend it. Delaware requires that the order can only be extended when the 
court finds, by a preponderance standard, that “domestic violence has 
occurred since the entry of the order,” or “a violation of the order has 
occurred.”166 Texas once required a violation of the initial order for a new 
order to be granted;167 however, the legislature instituted a new standard, 
allowing a petitioner to file with just a description of “the threatened 
harm that reasonably places the applicant in fear of imminent physical 
harm, bodily injury, assault, or sexual assault.”168 
 
 155.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345 (Deering 2020). 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Ritchie v. Konrad, 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). 
 158.  Id. at 388. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Felton v. Felton, 679 N.E.2d 672, 678 (Ohio 1997). 
 161.  UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-7-103 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  18 P.3d 1129 (Utah App. 2001). 
 164.  Id. at 1131–33. 
 165.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6a) (2018). 
 166.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045 (West 2018). 
 167.  Bree Buchanan & Cindy Dyer, 76th Legislative Session Domestic Violence 
Law Update, 62 TEX. B.J. 922, 923 (1999). 
 168.  TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 82.008 (West 2018). 
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While most petitioners bear the burden of proof in order to extend 
or renew a protective order,169 in Washington, the burden is on the 
respondent.170 Washington mandates the court to grant a renewal “unless 
the respondent proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
respondent will not resume acts of domestic violence against the 
petitioner or the petitioner’s children or family or household members 
when the order expires.”171 
Generally, most states that mandate a one-year initial order also 
permit year-long extensions.172 With that said, some states take a different 
approach to the length of the extension, basing the length of an extension 
on whether the initial order is violated. In Tennessee, the initial order is 
limited to one year.173 The respondent’s first violation may be 
accompanied by an extension of up to five years, and upon a second 
violation, the court may extend the order by up to ten years.174 Similarly, 
initial protective orders in Maryland are capped at one year, but violating 
the order allows the court to grant a final protective order of two years.175 
West Virginia’s initial order is limited to only ninety days, but if it is 
violated, the judge can extend the order indefinitely “for whatever period 
the court considers necessary to protect the physical safety of the 
petitioner.”176 On the extreme side, in Minnesota, when the respondent 
has violated an order more than twice, or if the petitioner has had more 
than two protective orders issued against the respondent, the statute 
allows a fifty-year order prohibiting contact and domestic violence.177 
Some states permit a permanent extension beyond the initial order. 
California allows for orders to be renewed permanently.178 Georgia also 
provides for a permanent extension.179 
C. Hybrid Approach 
Another model is the hybrid approach. Alaska additionally utilizes 
this approach—most provisions last one year, but subsection (c)(1), 
prohibiting acts or threats of domestic violence, can persist indefinitely.180 
 
 169.  Stoever, supra note 149, at 1050. 
 170.  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(3) (West 2018). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Stoever, supra note 149, at 1051. 
 173.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (West 2018). 
 174.  Id.  
 175.  MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-506(j) (West 2018). 
 176.  W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-27-505(c) (West 2018). 
 177.  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01(6a)(c) (West 2018). 
 178.  CAL. FAM. CODE § 6345(a) (West 2018). 
 179.  GA. CODE ANN. § 19-13-4(c) (West 2018). 
 180.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(b) (2020). 
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Under this model, some provisions last longer than others. In Delaware, 
for instance, most provisions last one year, but subsection (a)(1) and (a)(2), 
which prohibit the respondent from committing future acts of domestic 
violence and from contacting the petitioner, can last up to two years.181 
Louisiana limits most provisions to eighteen months; however, the court 
can indefinitely prohibit the respondent from “abusing, harassing, or 
interfering with the person or employment or going near the residence or 
place of employment of the petitioner.”182 
D. Permanent Orders 
Some states allow for permanent orders. In Alabama, final protection 
orders are “of permanent duration unless otherwise specified or modified 
by a subsequent order.”183 In Montana, based on the “respondent’s 
history of violence, the severity of the offense at issue, and the evidence 
presented at the hearing,” the court can grant a permanent order, which 
may contain any of the provisions allowed in a temporary order.184 New 
Jersey allows for permanent orders, termed “final restraining orders.”185 
Under the New Jersey law, the court must find, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the respondent committed one of the predicate acts 
required by the statute.186 Second, the court exercises its discretion as to 
whether a final restraining order should be granted.187 This decision is 
guided by a series of factors codified in the restraining order statute.188 
These factors are not comprehensive, but they offer New Jersey courts 
with a road map for instituting orders that have severe consequences. The 
factors are: 
(1) The previous history of domestic violence between the 
plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and 
physical abuse; 
(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; 
(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; 
(4) The best interests of the victim and any child; 
(5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of 
 
 181.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1045(a)–(b) (West 2018). 
 182.  LA. STAT. ANN. § 46:2135(A)(1) (2020) ((referencing the full description of 
prohibited behavior from § 46:2135(A)(1)). 
 183.  ALA. CODE § 30-5-7(d)(2) (2018). 
 184.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-15-204 (West 2018). 
 185.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29 (West 2018); A.M.C. v. P.B., 447 N.J. Super. 402, 
414 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016). 
 186.  Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-19a (West 2018). 
 187.  Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 126–27. 
 188.  Id. at 456. 
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the victim’s safety; and 
(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another 
jurisdiction.189 
New Jersey’s guided approach is an interesting solution to a process 
that can be susceptible to bias, but some commentators have highlighted 
serious flaws in the law, including an unnecessarily restrictive definition 
of abuse,190 as well as a failure to address incidents of non-intimate 
partner violence.191 
F. Firearms 
Limitations on the respondent’s ability to purchase and possess 
firearms are among the most effective provisions, but they are also 
perhaps the most contentious due to their tendency to limit the exercise 
of the Second Amendment. Crimes of domestic violence represent unique 
challenges when it comes to prevention. The abuse often gets worse with 
time,192 and similarly, the likelihood that the abuser uses a weapon 
increases with time.193 Additionally, according to the Giffords Law 
Center, women are five times more likely to be killed when the abuser 
owns a firearm, and acts of domestic violence are twelve times more likely 
to end in death when they involve a firearm.194 
Furthermore, policy choices regarding gun regulations may impact 
intimate partner homicide. One recent study of all states showed that 
those with the highest firearm ownership experienced a 64.6% higher 
domestic homicide rate compared to states with lower firearm ownership 
rates.195 
With that said, it is not entirely clear if protective orders aid in 
 
 189.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(a) (West 2018). 
 190.  Conner, supra note 152, at 355. 
 191.  Nick Tamburri, Note, A Lack of Civility: How New Jersey Fails to Protect 
Women, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1041, 1074 (2013). 
 192.  Stoever, supra note 149, at 1023 (citing Jessica R. Goodkind et al., A 
Contextual Analysis of Battered Women’s Safety Planning, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST 
WOMEN 514, 515 (2004) (“Once battering begins, it often escalates in frequency and 
severity over time.”)). 
 193.  Stoever, supra note 149, at 1024 (citing Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. 
Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes 
and Case Law, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 801, 1155 (1993)) (“[I]t is well documented that as 
domestic violence escalates, batterers often begin using weapons against their 
victims.”). 
 194.  Domestic Violence & Firearms, GIFFORDS L. CTR. (last visited Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/who-can-have-a-
gun/domestic-violence-firearms/#state. 
 195.  Aaron J. Kivisto et al., Firearm Ownership and Domestic Versus Nondomestic 
Homicide in the U.S., 57 AM. J. OF PREVENTATIVE MED. 311, 319 (2019). 
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prevention, though studies certainly indicate that they do make a positive 
difference. A 2009 Department of Justice report stated that “[t]he research 
has not been able to answer this question definitively, mainly because it 
is not ethically permissible to randomly grant or deny protective orders 
to compare results.”196 However, a more recent study from Michigan State 
University found that states with domestic violence protective order 
statutes that included firearm restrictions experienced a ten percent 
reduction in domestic-violence-related homicides,197 which confirmed 
similar results in prior studies.198 
Currently, Alaska’s statute permits firearm restrictions only “if the 
court finds that the respondent was in the actual possession of or used a 
firearm during the commission of the domestic violence.”199 In addition 
to Alaska, forty-two other states prohibit, in some form, the purchase or 
ownership of weapons while an order is in effect.200 The most progressive 
laws require police officers to confiscate firearms from the respondent 
once a domestic violence restraining order is granted.201 Less effective 
statutes require the respondent to surrender firearms when subject to a 
protective order,202 and other states only require respondents to do so 
 
 196.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES 58 (2009), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf. 
 197.  April Zeoli et al., Analysis of the Strength of Legal Firearms Restrictions for 
Perpetrators of Domestic Violence and Their Associations With Intimate Partner 
Homicide, 187 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 2365, 2366 (2018), 
https://academic.oup.com/aje/article-abstract/187/11/2365/ 
5154833?redirectedFrom=fulltext. 
 198.  See Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws Restricting 
Access to Firearms by Domestic Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner Homicide?, 
30 EVALUATION REV. 313, 332 (2006), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/ 
0193841X06287307 (finding an eight percent reduction in the domestic violence 
rate and a nine percent reduction in the rate of domestic violence crimes 
committed with a firearm); April M. Zeoli & Daniel W. Webster, Effects of Domestic 
Violence Policies, Alcohol Taxes and Police Staffing Levels on Intimate Partner Homicide 
in Large US Cities, 16 INJ. PREVENTION 90, 92 (2010), https:// 
injuryprevention.bmj.com/content/injuryprev/16/2/90.full.pdf (“[S]tate laws 
restricting access to firearms for those under [protective orders], laws allowing 
the police to arrest [protective order] violators, and higher police staffing levels 
reduce the risk of intimate-partner homicides.”). 
 199.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(c)(6)–(7) (2019). 
 200.  GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194. 
 201.  See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-29(b) (“A law enforcement officer shall 
accompany the defendant, or may proceed without the defendant if necessary, to 
any place where any firearm or other weapon belonging to the defendant is 
located to ensure that the defendant does not gain access to any firearm or other 
weapon, and a law enforcement officer shall take custody of any firearm or other 
weapon belonging to the defendant.”); GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194. 
 202.  See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173-B:5(I) (stating that, upon finding that 
domestic violence occurred, the court “shall direct the defendant to relinquish to 
the peace officer any and all firearms and ammunition in the control, ownership, 
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when certain conditions are met.203 Lastly, the weakest form of the statute 
permits (rather than requires) courts to direct respondents to surrender 
firearms.204 Alaska falls into this final category.205 
The strength of the statute is important because many respondents 
never relinquish their firearms, even when ordered by the court.206 
Indeed, the process by which firearms are removed can play an important 
role in the strength of the statute. Some statutes, like Alaska’s, fail to 
provide any instructions as to how firearms should be removed,207 
whereas others, like Pennsylvania, detail the process meticulously.208 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The path forward for Alaska’s domestic violence protective order 
statute has been paved by the trial and error of its fellow forty-nine states. 
Additionally, the legislative history of section 18.66.100 should provide 
some guidance as to a proper approach. The Alaska legislature has taken 
the much-needed step forward to fix the Whalen outcome, but arguably 
this fix should have been included in the original bill. And compared to 
other states, the Alaska protective order statutory scheme lags behind. 
The legislature must embrace its power to proactively tackle 
domestic violence and intimate partner homicide. This seems 
straightforward, but reviewing the deliberations demonstrates that, often, 
legislators are willing to nudge the statute forward only when it seems 
that Alaska is out of lockstep with the perceived standard set by other 
states. This is problematic for three reasons. First, as shown in the 
preceding Sections, finding a true standard is an impossible task, as these 
statutes are quite varied. Second, domestic violence is an inherently 
 
or possession of the defendant”); GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194. 
 203.  See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842-a(2)(a) (“[The court shall] order the 
immediate surrender [of firearms] where the court finds that the conduct which 
resulted in the issuance of the order of protection involved (i) the infliction of 
physical injury . . ., (ii) the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon or dangerous 
instrument . . ., or (iii) behavior constituting any violent felony offense.”); 
GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194. 
 204.  See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-26-5-9(c)(4); ALASKA STAT. §18.66.100(c)(7) 
(2020); GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194. 
 205.  § 18.66.100(c)(7) (2020). 
 206.  See Daniel W. Webster et al., Women with Protective Orders Report Failure to 
Remove Firearms from Their Abusive Partners: Results from an Exploratory Study, 19 J. 
OF WOMEN’S HEALTH 93, 96 (2010), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/ 
articles/PMC3120094/pdf/jwh.2007.0530.pdf (in a study of female victims of 
domestic violence in New York and Los Angeles, only twelve percent reported 
that their abuser had surrendered his firearms or had them seized). 
 207.  GIFFORDS L. CTR., supra note 194. 
 208.  See 23 PA. CONS. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(7) (West 2018) 
(detailing meticulous process for firearm removal). 
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complex issue, which requires a proactive approach; the legislature 
cannot continue to wait until Alaska seems behind the pace of an already 
unclear standard. Lastly, the issue of domestic violence is potentially 
worse in Alaska than in any other state. One Anchorage-based activist 
described the problem through this lens: “If Alaska was a Third World 
country, with the rates of domestic violence and sexual assault that we 
have, they’d declare a humanitarian crisis and the United Nations would 
move in.”209 To truly make a dent in this issue, the legislature should 
adopt a leadership—not lockstep—mentality. This is where the menu of 
options available, based on other states’ approaches, should prove useful. 
A. Length 
A number of states empower judges with the discretion to tailor the 
length of orders,210 whereas section 18.66.100 mandates a year-long order 
(aside from the indefinite length applicable in subsection (c)(1)).211 The 
discretion to issue a longer order could be useful for the worst cases; 
petitioners would not be forced to confront their abusers in court, relive 
the abuse, and repeatedly make their case year after year. And longer 
orders would ensure a longer period of protection as well. Instead of 
burdening a petitioner with the task of renewing the protective 
provisions, the provisions would persist for a timeframe more consistent 
with the potential harm. 
Relatedly, the legislature could codify the possibility of a permanent 
order.212 Some cases of domestic violence are so heinous and persistent 
that a permanent order could be a proportionate solution, but without 
that possibility, such cases are treated as any other. States offering the 
option of a permanent order typically include a series of factors upon 
which the court can base its decision,213 likely due to the severe 
consequences of such orders. If it should choose to include an option for 
a permanent order, the Alaska legislature should follow suit and identify 
factors to help guide courts. 
 
 
 209.  Lindsay Schnell, A Deadly place: Alaska is the Most Dangerous State for 
Women, Now They’re Fighting Back, USA TODAY (June 25, 2019), https:// 
www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/nation/2019/06/25/deadly-place-metoo-
hits-alaska-women-demand-tougher-laws/1503365001/. 
 210.  See supra Section VII.A. 
 211.  ALASKA STAT. § 18.66.100(b)(2) (2019). 
 212.  See supra Section VII.D. 
 213.  See supra Section VII.D. 
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B. Extension Mechanism 
The legislative response to Whalen was subsection (f), which requires 
the petitioner to convince the court that “an extension of the provisions of 
the order is necessary to protect the petitioner from domestic violence.”214 
While an adequate response to Whalen, the extension can be improved to 
address more than just that defect. 
First, Alaska could place the burden of persuasion on the 
respondent, as seen in Washington.215 There, the respondent must prove 
“by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent will not resume 
acts of domestic violence.”216 Legally, such a burden ensures that the 
respondent must undertake the legwork of collecting the evidence 
necessary to prove why the respondent is no longer a threat. The work of 
dispelling the presumption that the respondent is prone to future violence 
should legally fall upon the respondent’s shoulders, not just because it 
forces the respondent to take accountability for past acts and future 
behavior, but most importantly because such evidence is likely in the 
respondent’s possession and control, not the petitioner’s. 
For fairness purposes, the perpetrator of domestic violence should at 
least demonstrate why consequences, triggered by the respondent, need not 
continue to restrain the respondent; victims should not be compelled to 
satisfy a burden of proof to ensure their own protection. Lastly, the 
petitioner’s requirement of showing the necessity of an extension is a high 
bar to meet, especially when the respondent has not in fact demonstrated 
further harmful behavior. There is little reason to avoid requiring the 
respondent, who instigated the necessity of the original order, to at least 
meet a similar burden. 
Second, Alaska could tie mandatory extensions to the violation of a 
protective order, similar to Tennessee.217 Not only would this promote 
efficiency, but it could serve a preventative function. The knowledge that 
a violation would lead to more severe consequences—a graduated 
extension length corresponding to the number of violations—might 
dissuade bad actors. 
C. Firearms 
The treatment of firearms in section 18.66.100 is the most pressing 
aspect of future amendments. Considering the evidence tying gun 
 
 214.  § 18.66.100(f). 
 215.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.50.060(3) (West 2018). 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-605(b) (West 2018); see also supra Section VII.B. 
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ownership to intimate partner homicide,218 common sense dictates that 
those who are subject to domestic violence restraining orders should also 
be subject to stricter firearm restrictions. Alaska authorizes courts to 
direct respondents to surrender their firearms, and courts are granted that 
authority only when the court finds that the respondent was in actual 
possession of or used a firearm while committing the domestic 
violence.219 This provision is problematic for three reasons. 
First, courts are not required to direct respondents to surrender their 
firearms, they are merely authorized to do so. The connection between 
domestic violence, access to firearms, and intimate partner homicide is 
too overwhelming to merely authorize a court to direct the 
relinquishment of firearms. 
Second, permitting the court to order the respondent’s 
relinquishment only when certain conditions are met is an unnecessary 
constraint. The issue is that domestic violence, however it may arise, can 
lead to intimate partner homicide; thus, it is too constrictive at best, and 
arbitrary at worst, to order firearm relinquishment only when the 
violence is perpetrated with a firearm or when a firearm is actually 
possessed. 
Third, merely ordering the relinquishment of firearms is not 
effective.220 The legislature should turn to Pennsylvania for a guide on 
detailing the process by which firearms should be revoked, a process 
which, ideally, should be carried out by law enforcement.221 
 
****** 
While the legislature should be commended for its swift action 
following Whalen, the 2019 amendment should open the door to further 
action rather than a regression to complacence. The aforementioned 
recommendations may instruct the legislature should it choose to amend 
the law. The scourge of domestic violence is perhaps worse in Alaska than 
in any other state, and it is time for the legislature to lead on the issue. 
This Note outlines how the statutory scheme has developed to its current 
condition, and it details a number of improvements that the legislature 
can adopt. However, this Note covers only some of the legislative tools 
available, and ideally the legislature can more comprehensively address 
domestic violence than it has in the past. The time is ripe for action, and 
with effective lawmaking, lives can be saved. 
 
 218.  Supra Section VII.D. 
 219.  § 18.66.100(c)(7). 
 220.  Webster et al., supra note 206.  
 221.  See 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6108(7) (West 2018) (detailing a 
meticulous process for firearm removal). 
